As Russian military activity approaches the Ukrainian border with NATO, the possibility of a direct confrontation between Russia and the alliance increases. On 13 March, it was reported that Russian aircraft fired rockets at the Yavoriv International Centre for the Maintenance of Peace and Security, 20 km from Ukraine's border with NATO member Poland.
The likelihood that a unit of the Russian or Belarusian army will stumble upon a border is also high. Mistakes occur in all military organizations, something that was clearly demonstrated in recent days, when India accidentally launched a missile towards Pakistan, two nations with weapons nuclear power in a state of high voltage. The possibility of reprisals by Pakistan was important, but unlike Ukraine there is no open conflict to confuse the situation. Had such an event occurred between Poland and Russian forces in Ukraine, for example, it is unlikely that the Polish government would have been convinced that the missile launch was a mistake.
Concern for Russia's intentions is greater in the eastern NATO nations than in the western ones. On March 15, the prime ministers of Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic risked traveling by train to Ukraine to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kiev. These countries run the risk of being next on the list if Russian expansionism continues, as some expect. Vladimir Putin's statements seem to threaten the Baltic states, and he seems to want to restore Russia's dominance over other neighboring nations that was lost in the fall of the Soviet Union. These states have significant ethnic Russian minorities and have experienced riots in recent years.
The possibility of escalation increases if we take into account the actions of the rank-and-file soldiers on the ground, who are cold and frightened. A single shot across a calm but tense border, or a junior non-commissioned officer who misinterprets a particular situation and takes aggressive action, could start a struggle that rapidly escalates beyond the control of local commanders.
Zelensky has repeatedly called for a NATO reinforced “no-fly zone” over Ukraine. But NATO leaders have come to the conclusion, understandably, that this poses a risk of direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO forces, which could lead to a rapid escalation. The same seems to be the case with another of Zelensky's requests: the supply of aircraft to help the Ukrainian air force. But if NATO were to directly provide aircraft to Ukraine, Russia could come to the conclusion that these weapons are offensive, and not defensive, and take steps to stop the supply of aircraft. This may involve attacks on the airfields on which the aircraft are based - for example, in Poland - before they move to Ukraine.
There is a possibility that Zelensky asked for a NATO-sponsored no-fly zone precisely because he knows it would be impossible, which would allow him to begin to distance himself from the idea of Ukraine's accession to NATO. This could give him the room for negotiation to conclude an agreement with Russia. But at the same time, in his speech to the United States Congress, he recalled the attacks in Pearl Harbour and 9/11. Zelensky warns of the consequences of NATO's continued inaction.
Article 5
Membership in NATO allows a nation to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to request the support of other members of the alliance. This article has only been used once in NATO history: by the United States, following the attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington DC.
But Article 5 does not guarantee that all other NATO States will send armed forces to repel an attack, but that military action is an option that can be included as part of the alliance's principle of “collective defense”. Given Westminster's public statements, the United Kingdom is expected to fulfill its obligation to fight a Russian attack. As British Health Secretary Sajid Javid said only a few days ago in an LBC interview: “If a single Russian toe goes into NATO territory, there will be war with NATO.”
On February 25, the day after Russian forces invaded Ukraine, NATO heads of government gathered in Brussels. They made a statement in which they deplored the invasion and pledged to help Ukraine. The alliance pledged to “continue to take all necessary measures and decisions to ensure the security and defence of all allies”. As a result, NATO has deployed land and sea means in its eastern regions and “has activated NATO's defense plans to prepare us to respond to a series of contingencies and secure the territory of the alliance”.
My research on NATO has included informal discussions with several officials from several member nations. This has led me to think that some NATO countries further away from the conflict zone might be reluctant to send combat forces, even if Article 5 were activated. There is also the question of whether NATO political leaders would be willing to carry out attacks on Russian soil, which would represent a significant escalation of the conflict and would carry the additional risk of Russia responding with an escalation of nuclear or chemical weapons.
Deterrence - whether conventional or nuclear - requires rational calculation on both sides. As I wrote before, Putin's rationality is different from that of Western leaders, which is part of the reason why this crisis and conflict occurred in the first place. So far, Putin has not been deterred by NATO. On the contrary, it has threatened the alliance with “consequences never seen in history”.
In the meantime, any concession Russia obtains in the peace talks will likely lead to more demands. This is of particular concern to NATO members from Eastern Europe. What is not clear is whether the most distant NATO members view the threat in the same way. Unity of action is vital for NATO, not only now, but in the coming weeks and months.
Article originally published in The Conversation - By Kenton White, Professor of Strategic Studies and International Relations, University of Reading
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